Analyses revealed the following effects. Perceived efficacy. For smokers and short term consequences, the gain frame would be more used than both loss and foregone gain frames. For smokers and long term consequences, both gain and loss frames are preferred to foregone gain and avoided loss frames.
For no smokers and long term Figure 1: Means of perceived efficacy of the persuasive consequences, loss frame is preferred to the other three messages across conditions frames. The three-way interaction was not significant. This is Acknowledgments probably due to the fact that both avoided loss and foregone gain messages contain negations and are linguistically more This research was supported by a grant COFIN Indeed, participants judge them less clear and harder to understand.
As our results show, message content References has an important effect: participants perceive as more Banks, S. The effect of message consequences, probably because they refer to stronger framing on mammography utilization. Furthermore, message content interacts with Edwards, A. Presenting risk information. Journal of Health Communication, 6, This result goes in the same direction as results obtained by Fiske, S.
Social Cognition. Theinfluence of framing on risky loss framings is shown when arguments strength is varied. Organizational Behavior and Given that long-term consequences are preferred by Human Decision Processes, 75, All frames strong arguments. Smokers and non smokers perceive are not created equal: A typology and critical analysisof efficacy of gain framed messages and loss framed messages framing effects.
Organizational Behavior and Human in an opposite way: non smokers prefer loss framed messages Decision Processes, 76, The influence of framed messages more persuasive than loss messages, or message framing and issue involvement. Journal of would use both frames. As smokers should be more involved Marketing Research, 27, Journal of Personality and Social showed in the high-involvement condition loss frames are Psychology, 52, Positive-negative frames are more persuasive.
European modulate the effect of personal involvement. Campaigns Review of Social Psychology, 1, The systematic influence of gain-and- and loss frames are more expected than gain frames, loss-framed messages on interest and use of different types especially by smokers who are more often exposed to them of health behavior. Personality and Social Psychology than non smokers in Italy negatively framed messages are Bullettin, 25, According to Smith and Petty Siminoff, L.
Effects of outcome , framing effects depend on detailed processing and framing on treatment decisions in the real world: Impact of detailed processing may be induced by not expected framing on adjiuvant breast cancer decisions. Medical framings. Our results show that probably the effect of Decision Making, 9, Message framing and participants, in that only smokers reveal this effect. Personality Our research suggests that in planning campaigns and Social Psychology Bullettin, 22, Practice and persuasive frame: Effects on beliefs, communication.
Thus, a general strategy may be to use loss intention, and performance of a cancer self-examination. Giving in to feel good: unexpected message frames that affect involved people: in The palce of emotion regulation in the context of general order to convince smokers to give up with cigarettes, it might self-control. Psychological Inquiry, 11, The framing of only loss framed messages. Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.
Need an account? Click here to sign up. Download Free PDF. Adam Corner. A short summary of this paper. Argumentation DOI This poses a potential problem, because people might be unduly and unsuspectingly influenced by mere presentational differ- ences. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, however, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent—and hence, whether there is any nor- mative requirement for them to be equally persuasive—is a difficult task.
Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent. The normative implications of this for both speakers and listeners are discussed. Corner, U. Framing effects would seem to violate the normative demand that advocates present information in an unbiased and accurate way—because differ- ently framed messages may be differentially persuasive. By drawing on recent cognitive psychological work on framing effects in choice and decision making paradigms, we show that establishing whether two arguments are substantively equivalent and hence, whether there is any normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive is a difficult task: Even arguments that are logically equivalent may not be information equivalent.
Crucially though, where arguments are not information equivalent, there is no normative requirement for them to be equally persuasive. Thus, framing effects need not indicate a conflict between normative argumentative practice and persuasive success. The question of whether there is ever conflict between normatively sound argumentative practice and successful social influence is one that has important implications for social psychological research on persuasion as well as philosoph- ically oriented work on argumentation.
Social psychologists carry out experimental work documenting the persuasive effectiveness of different types of appeals, whereas argumentation scholars tend to be more concerned with constructing normative theories of what should make appeals effective.
Despite covering close conceptual ground, though, the persuasion and argumentation literatures typically operate entirely independently of each other. As a direct consequence, the central question of whether persuasive effectiveness corresponds to normative principles of argument strength—that is, whether what does persuade people is what should persuade people—is conspicuous by its absence from both literatures. This question is of both theoretical and practical importance. The grounds for this come from our own recent work on the fallacies.
However, that people might respond so differently to gain-framed and loss-framed appeals, even when the arguments they contain are held constant, seems normatively problematic and makes further examination of this phenomenon interesting.
A framing effect in a decision task is said to occur when equivalent descriptions lead to different decisions—an apparently clear violation of the basic normative principle of invariance between equivalent choices Kahneman and Tversky ; Tversky and Kahneman , ; for a review see Levin et al.
Repeated empirical demonstrations have shown that logically equivalent descriptions of a decision problem can lead to systematically different decisions—depending on the way that the problem is framed.
For example, in a famous task developed by Tversky and Kahneman , participants read the following information: Imagine that the US is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill people.
One possible program to combat the disease has been proposed. Assume that the exact scientific estimate of the consequences of this program is as follows: Some of the participants are then presented with a gain-framed choice between A and B: A: If this program is adopted, people will be saved. B: If this program is adopted, there is a one-third probability that people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved.
The other participants are presented with a loss-framed choice between C and D: C: If this program is adopted, people will die. D: If this program is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds probability that people will die. Hahn Despite the fact that A and C and B and D are logically equivalent, participants routinely prefer A to B, but D to C—a seemingly clear violation of the principle of description invariance.
Consequently, framing effects in persuasive messages are typically demonstrated using scenarios that would ultimately in real-world situations require a decision to be made.
Messages concerning the success i. In a typical study, information is communicated to participants in support of a hypothetical decision about whether or not to accept the treatment in question. They will not know that if they had been exposed to a differently-framed appeal, they might have made different choices.
This way of putting things makes appeal framing look rather like a fallacy, at least in some traditional ways of thinking about fallacies. A long-standing characteristic worry about fallacies is that they lead an unsuspecting audience to be influenced in ways it otherwise would not have been.
And here we might have a similar concern: Audiences will be influenced in ways they otherwise would not have been—not because of the substance of the appeals, but because of the phrasing of the appeals. This view of framing effects seems plausible. Intuitively, the persuasiveness of two equivalent messages should normatively be indifferent to presentational devices, and depend only on the information conveyed.
Crucially though, establishing whether framing effects pose a threat to normative argumentative practice requires a method of establishing whether two differently- framed messages really are equivalent. If two messages are not equivalent, then there is no normative requirement that they should be equally persuasive. As we shall see in the following section, however, establishing whether two messages are substantively equivalent can be deceptively difficult.
Recent theoretical and experimental work on framing effects in decision tasks has suggested that the normative principle that equivalent descriptions must lead to identical decisions is more complex than it first appears. McKenzie and Nelson proposed that although two differently framed choices may be logically equivalent i. And if they are not equivalent, there is no normative problem with them being treated differently. They predicted that when describing a fixed state e.
Even more closely related to the present context, McKenzie and Nelson showed analogous effects in a medical context involving a new treatment, the mortality results of which were described either in terms of the percentage of patients who survive or the percentage who die. Using this approach, there is not necessarily any discrepancy between the existence of framing effects and normative theories of choice.
Applying the reference point hypothesis to framing effects in persuasion suggests that even where they contain seemingly equivalent arguments, differently framed messages may not be information equivalent.
Typically, differently framed messages genuinely convey different communicative information. Needless to say, this is valuable communicative information, and a rational listener should take account of this information when evaluating the strength of any persuasive message.
Do the same considerations, then, apply to gain vs. The studies of McKenzie and colleagues demonstrate that information equiva- lence cannot, in general, be inferred from logical equivalence. Minimally, actual evidence of information equivalence is required, and such information will typically not be that easy to obtain see Sher and McKenzie , for further discussion. Moreover, McKenzie and colleagues have demonstrated other examples of pragmatic information leakage beyond just attribute framing Mckenzie et al.
For example, Mckenzie et al. McKenzie et al. This choice is governed by a variety of pragmatic considerations, and hence gives information about these considerations see e. From the perspective of natural language pragmatics, information equivalence seems the exception, not the norm. As Grice noted, speakers endeavour to be cooperative and hence they craft their utterances to be relevant the maxim of relevance , concise the maxim of quantity and accurate the maxim of quality.
Hence, the very act of selecting one utterance over another may offer valuable clues as to the communicative intention of the speaker.
This alone makes it unlikely that gain and loss frames, generally, are information equivalent. The truth of if p then q does not imply the truth of if not p, not q. Hahn If p then q Not q Therefore p would be a logically valid inference. In short, gain-framed messages and their loss-framed counterparts are not information equivalent, because they already differ with respect to the most basic aspect of information equivalence—the states of affairs that make them true or false.
This view seems untenable. The differences between the arguments are more than stylistic. In the absence of any direct empirical evidence on the issue, the assumption must be that people knowingly or otherwise distinguish between the two—given how sensitive they are to linguistic variation in general.
Correspondingly, differential sensitivity in persuasion does not seem normatively problematic—different arguments can elicit different effects. This would seem to undermine the potential normative problem of the differential persuasiveness of gain and loss-framed messages.
We share this intuition. It might be debatable, and hence puzzling, whether it is normatively acceptable to choose one of two frames purely on the basis of potential persuasive effect where they are equivalent.
However, the situation seems much clearer where they are not equivalent. The concept of information equivalence and its relation to natural language pragmatics more generally clarifies how and why frame selection can conflict with responsible advocacy: Mis-selection of an information non-equivalent frame can violate conversational norms, which are assumed by the listener.
However, this seems not only a violation of normatively responsible advocacy— it also might not maximise persuasive success at least, if the communication is ongoing.
Though exaggeration and misinformation might incur short-term gains, they are clearly associated with long-term losses. Consideration of source reliability is not only normative for listeners e.
Hence, even where frame selection is directly constrained by norms of advocacy, this need not ultimately conflict with the goal of persuasive success. At a minimum, it makes clear what additional considerations need to be taken into account before substantive equivalence of gain- framed and loss-framed appeals can be assumed. In the absence of such equivalence, any subsequent differences in persuasion simply do not speak to questions of normativity.
Of course, this does not mean that framing effects in persuasion might never be fallacious or indicate a conflict with the goals of normatively responsible advocacy. However, additional evidence on equivalence is required - informational equivalence cannot simply be inferred from logical equivalence, and it is information equivalence that is crucial.
References Adams, E. A primer of probability logic. Corner, A. Hahn, and M. The Slippery slope argument: Probability, utility and category boundary reappraisal. In Proceedings of the 28th annual conference of the cognitive science society, — Grice, H. Studies in the way of words. Harvard: Harvard University Press. Hahn, U. A Bayesian approach to informal reasoning fallacies. Synthese 2 : — Why a normative theory of argument strength and why might one want it to be Bayesian? Informal Logic 1— The rationality of informal argumentation: A Bayesian approach to reasoning fallacies.
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